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Of Metals and Men:  
Kofman, Conversion and The Merchant of Venice 
DUNCAN LARGE 
 
My focus in this article is on one of Sarah Kofman’s less often studied texts, her extended essay 
on Freud’s reading of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, which was published in French 
in 1987 as a small book — Conversions: ‘Le Marchand de Venise’ sous le signe de Saturne 
(Conversions: The Merchant of Venice under the Sign of Saturn) — and in English translation 
(by Shaun Whiteside) three years later.1 I will first examine Conversions as a response to a 
literary text, and consider the light it sheds on the relation between philosophy, psychoanalysis 
and literature in Kofman’s work — for it is not just a reading of a literary text but a reading of 
a reading (by Freud), set off, as I shall argue, by a third interlocutor (Nietzsche). After setting 
out Freud’s interpretation of The Merchant of Venice, then, and Kofman’s response to it, I want 
to concentrate on Kofman’s methodology and the crucial role played in Conversions by the 
concept of ambivalence. I will read this text as consonant with Kofman’s career-long concern 
for tropes and metaphors, for transformations and metamorphoses — at the most basic level, 
how one thing turns into another — and argue that her ultimately intense deconstructive interest 
in ambivalence acts as a riposte to the binary logic of conversion that she sees at work all too 
often in Freud. 
 Kofman’s short book is actually a critique of the notion of conversion, then, but beyond 
these initial frames of reference, in the latter half of the article I want to bring out three other 
kinds of conversion in Shakespeare’s play which seem to me to be neglected by Kofman 
herself, and (in true Kofmanian fashion) subject these absences and aporias to my own 
symptomatic readings. I will read Conversions as an aspect of Kofman’s increasing interest in 
the 1980s in Judaism, and in coming to terms with her own Jewishness: one of the conversions 
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which Kofman thematizes is Shylock’s forced conversion from Judaism to Christianity at the 
end of Act IV of Shakespeare’s play, but I will be focussing on the other religious conversion 
in the play which Kofman neglects, namely the unforced conversion of Shylock’s daughter 
Jessica. That will inevitably bring me on to examining some of the autobiographical elements 
which we can (and indeed are invited to) interpret après coup in the light of her late autobio-
graphical text Rue Ordener, Rue Labat (1994), specifically her own conversion to Christianity 
during the Second World War. I will also consider the theme of cross-dressing and gender 
fluidity in Shakespeare’s text, which Kofman leaves surprisingly uncommented (given where 
the text comes in her oeuvre), and conclude by addressing one final supplementary sense of 
‘conversion’, the question of translation. 
 
‘La relève de la philosophie’ 
Let me begin my analysis proper with a methodological reflection, by putting some linguistic 
pressure on the title of this collection: ‘the relief of philosophy’. In (Derridean) French this 
formulation seems to me to describe rather well Kofman’s attitude towards philosophy: ‘la 
relève de la philosophie’ or the sublation of philosophy. For Kofman philosophy is always 
destined to be sublated by literature and psychoanalysis: she holds the three in suspension, and 
they supplement each other. One could even go so far as to say ‘ça relève de la philosophie’ — 
it is in the nature of philosophy to be sublated. It is this approach that makes for the uncommon 
richness of Kofman’s readings — advocating and demonstrating that the literary text has a truth 
of its own which is every bit as vital and urgent as the philosophical and psychoanalytic truths 
which it pre-empts. This, after all, is only what Freud himself maintained, in his letter to the 
great Viennese dramatist Arthur Schnitzler on the occasion of the latter’s 60th birthday in 1922: 
‘I have formed the impression that you know through intuition — or rather from detailed self-
observation — everything that I have discovered by laborious work on other people.’2 
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Kofman was writing on the intimate nexus between literature and philosophy right from 
her earliest publication (a 1963 article on Sartre).3 Throughout her career she chose to work on 
literary philosophers and on philosophical literary writers, always scrupulous not to maintain a 
strict separation between the two categories. In her early publications of the 1970s she follows 
Freud’s literary tastes in reading Freud’s literary readings — a series of four essays which 
would become Quatre romans analytiques (1974) — and Conversions is clearly a pendant to 
that project (even if, as it happens, it was published in English in 1990, a year before Sarah 
Wykes’s translation of Quatre romans analytiques as Freud and Fiction).4 Kofman had not 
written on Shakespeare before this, and indeed she would not do so again: her interest is in 
Freud’s reading, not so much in the Shakespeare itself, but in turn my interest will be in the 
interpretative gaps that inevitably result from such an approach. 
 
Conversion and Ambivalence (Freud, Shakespeare, Nietzsche) 
Kofman’s essay is a reading of Freud’s short piece ‘Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl’ (1913; 
literally ‘The Motif of the Choice of Caskets’, translated in the Standard Edition as ‘The Theme 
of the Three Caskets’).5 Here Freud opens with a discussion of The Merchant of Venice and 
rapidly establishes a parallel with a second Shakespeare play, King Lear: one of the important 
sub-plots of The Merchant of Venice has Portia’s suitors choosing between three caskets, and 
(once the caskets have been ‘translated’ by Freud into three women, by a process of ‘symbolic 
substitution’ [symbolische Ersetzung] [TT, 236 / MK, 184]) this episode is paralleled with Lear 
choosing between his three daughters. In each case the least showy and apparently least 
valuable of the options is actually of the greatest value: in The Merchant it is the lead casket 
that contains the portrait of Portia, indicating a successful choice and her hand in marriage; in 
King Lear it is Cordelia whose mute love for Lear appears least but in fact is most fiercely 
sustained. Freud marshals a number of further examples from myth and fairy tales where a 
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male character chooses between three women (for example the Judgement of Paris, or 
‘Cinderella’), and isolates a common characteristic of muteness. He argues that the muteness 
of the chosen one indicates (by impeccable dream logic) that it (she) in fact symbolizes death, 
and the fact that the process is represented as an act of choice rather than an ineluctable 
necessity indicates for Freud a wish-fulfilment (as in a dream): such scenarios figure the desire 
to control one’s own destiny, and the ultimate three women are indeed the Fates, who are 
depicted on the cover of the French edition of Kofman’s text. 
 As Kofman points out (CE, 145 / CF, 23), Freud reads these literary works as if they 
were dreams, in other words his interpretation uses the binary logic of substitution and 
inversion (Ersetzung and Umkehrung are the key operative terms in the text).6 Freudian dream 
logic is a logic of transformations, whereby one thing turns into another (its opposite), one 
thing can be translated into another in an interpretation which unfolds according to a principle 
of strict one-to-one equivalence. Thus in Shakespeare’s text (on Freud’s reading, according to 
Kofman) the first substitution is the claim that the three caskets stand for three women (hence 
the parallel with Lear), but Freud in fact makes a chain of substitutions, of which this is only 
the first: the lead casket signifies the pale, mute woman, who in turn signifies death; as in 
medieval alchemy, lead is but the point of departure for a series of transformations (CF, 44 / 
CE, 152). 
But Kofman highlights an important and under-recognized feature of Freud’s analysis: 
there is a point in Freud’s narrative where the binary dream logic of inversion and substitution 
gives way to the recognition of ‘an ancient ambivalence’ of meaning (TT, 244 / MK, 191), 
between love and death (as two sides of the same coin). It is not that one turns into the other, 
he argues, but that both are available at the same time, and he points out the historic identity 
between different guises of Aphrodite: the goddess of love is also the bringer of death. So in 
this case the process of conversion is incomplete because the one has not been transformed into 
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the other wholly and without residue. Instead of a straight ‘replacement by the opposite’ 
(Ersetzung durch das Gegenteil) (TT, 244 / MK, 190), the ‘opposite’ origin remains, at least in 
trace form, and gives itself away to the trained hermeneut who knows where to look: ‘On closer 
inspection we observe, to be sure, that the original myth is not so thoroughly distorted that 
traces of it (Resterscheinungen) do not show through and betray its presence’  (TT, 245 / MK, 
191). 
Although Kofman doesn’t establish the parallel, this is actually (also) a Nietzschean 
gesture. Just as Freud is interested in the alchemical process of dream/myth interpretation and 
of literary symbolism, whereby something stands for and needs to be interpreted as its opposite, 
so Nietzsche is also drawn to the alchemical, to the conversion of base metal into gold, in the 
context of values. He opens his 1878 text Human, All Too Human with a ‘chemistry of concepts 
and sensations’, arguing: 
 
Historical philosophy, by contrast (...), has ascertained (...) that there are no opposites 
(...): according to its explanation, there are, strictly speaking, neither any unegoistical 
actions nor any completely disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations 
(Sublimirungen), in which the fundamental element appears to have almost evaporated 
(fast verflüchtigt erscheint) and reveals its presence only to the keenest observation.7 
 
Kofman explicitly criticizes Freud for a failure to see the importance of this kind of 
ambivalence in Shakespeare’s text: ‘Freud’s error’, she writes (CE, 151 / CF, 41), is that he is 
led astray by the dream logic of inversion to focus exclusively on the lead casket (which he 
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Thus, gold, silver and lead are all ambivalent, with an ambivalence that is concealed by 
their being split into three different, even opposite metals, which disguises their 
profound kinship, their common derivation from the metal which is supposed to be the 
most base: lead or Saturn; a split which masks the fact that each of them, and not lead 
alone, secretes (porte inscrit en lui) time, the risk of transformation, of deterioration, of 
transmutation in one direction or the other, and conceals, beneath gilded and silvered 
surfaces, genesis, development (le devenir) and death. (CE, 153 / CF, 46). 
 
Shaun Whiteside’s English translation of ‘le devenir’ in the final sentence as ‘development’ 
rather than ‘becoming’ conceals the Nietzschean co-ordinates of Kofman’s analysis; 
elsewhere, for example, she refers explicitly to Shylock’s ‘will to power’ (CE, 161 / CF, 66). 
In Conversions Kofman applies a Nietzsche-derived corrective to Freud — and appropriately 
enough her English translator Whiteside would go on to translate Nietzsche’s The Birth of 
Tragedy for Penguin Classics three years later.8 
 For Kofman’s hermeneutics, then, the concept of ambivalence is crucial and supersedes 
(dare one say, sublates) the various conversions on which Freud concentrates.9 Conversion is 
usually associated with a Damascene moment of anagnorisis (recognition) and peripeteia 
(sudden reversal of fortune — of the kind that befalls Shakespeare’s merchant of Venice, 
Antonio, no less than twice in the course of the play), where scales fall from eyes and one thing 
flips or converts into another. Conversion is often accompanied by a violence: a developing 
situation reaches a tipping point, then switches in a catastrophic event — and indeed on the 
back cover of the French edition of Conversions Kofman glosses ‘conversion’ as ‘catastrophic 
reversal’10 (cf. CE, 152 / CF, 43). In the process of conversion, one thing wholly becomes 
another, stands for the other and takes its place, entirely occluding it. But the message of 
ambivalence is that no successful, complete, perfective conversion is possible. The two obey 
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differing logics: on the one hand Freud’s binary logic of either/or; on the other Kofman’s 
deconstructive post-binary logic of both/and. In turn, Kofman herself proceeds to generalize 
the category of ambivalence and apply it to the rest of the play’s themes in a chapter, ‘Towards 
a General Ambivalence’, that takes up over half of her text (CF, 31-70). Such a generalized 
theory of ambivalence is characterized by situations where two mutually antagonistic meanings 
exist simultaneously, one always poised to turn into the other on the stroke of an interpretation, 
like a semiotic Schrödinger’s cat (conversion is an activity, ambivalence is a state awaiting an 
interpretation).11 
Kofman’s argument reaches its culmination in her characterization of ‘the structural 
ambivalence of time’ itself: ‘With and through time, which is fundamentally ambivalent, all 
conversions remain possible’ (CE, 156 / CF, 54). This is what Kofman calls the ‘true “theme” 
of this baroque drama’ (back cover; cf. CF, 68 / CE, 161). It is not the first time that Kofman 
has made the notion of ambivalence work this hard: it is crucial to her reading of Freud’s texts 
on E.T.A. Hofmann too, for example,12 and — incarnated in the recurring figure of the Janus 
face — it is an important feature of her analysis of Freud’s book on jokes, of Nietzsche’s 
autobiography Ecce homo, and so forth.13 In the conclusion to Conversions her claim is that 
the generalization of ambivalence (dis)qualifies Freud’s overly simplistic readings of literature 
based on dream interpretations which in turn hinge on one-for-one decipherings. Kofman is 
presenting an alternative hermeneutics: she is correcting ‘Freud’s error’ not only in his reading 
of this play but his reading of fiction more generally. One might say that Kofman converts 
conversion into ambivalence (and she argues that Freud missed a trick by not doing so himself), 
or that conversion is sublated by ambivalence. 
 
Jessica and Sarah 
 
   
 
8 
At this point, though, one is entitled to feel slightly puzzled by the title of Kofman’s work. 
Specifically: if ambivalence sublates (relève) conversion as an interpretative category, why 
does the book highlight the term to such an extent? After all, The Merchant of Venice is 
described by Kofman as ‘a drama of conversion in all its forms’ (CE, 162 / CF, 68f.). Now we 
need to bear in mind that ‘Conversions’ is Kofman’s word, not Freud’s, and she has chosen a 
particularly polysemous word to summarize all the different kinds of transformation that she is 
interested in, in Shakespeare’s play and Freud’s reading of it. The German translation of her 
text is titled Konversionen (1989),14 but that is not a term that Freud himself uses in his essay 
— as mentioned above, Freud predominantly uses the terms Ersetzung and Umkehrung, 
meaning respectively substitution and inversion. The dictionary offers many other possible 
German terms for ‘conversion’, most of which are formed with the prefix ‘Um’ — 
Umrechnung, Umsetzung, Umbau, Umstellung, Umwandlung, Umformung, Umwechslung, 
Umdeutung — but Freud doesn’t use any of these in his essay. Nor indeed does Freud use the 
more standard word for religious conversion in German, Bekehrung, which is used by August 
Wilhelm von Schlegel in the standard German translated edition of the play, at the only point 
in Shakespeare’s text when religious ‘conversion’ is explicitly mentioned, by Shylock’s 
daughter Jessica in III.5: 
 
Nay, you need not fear us, Lorenzo. Launcelot and I are out. He tells me flatly there’s 
no mercy for me in heaven because I am a Jew’s daughter, and he says you are no good 
member of the commonwealth, for in converting Jews to Christians, you raise the price 
of pork. (Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, III.5.25-29)15 
 
Ihr habt nichts zu befürchten, Lorenzo; Lanzelot und ich, wir sind ganz entzweit. Er 
sagt mir grade heraus, im Himmel sei keine Gnade für mich, weil ich eines Juden 
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Tochter bin; und er behauptet, daß Ihr kein gutes Mitglied des gemeinen Wesens seid, 
weil Ihr Juden zum Christentum bekehrt und dadurch den Preis des Schweinefleisches 
steigert.16 
 
By highlighting ‘conversion’ in her title, and using a word, ‘Conversions’, which allows (more 
easily than in German) a parallel to be established between religious conversion and other 
kinds, Kofman draws greater attention than otherwise to, precisely, the religious connotation 
of conversion (and she certainly makes more of the theme than does Freud, who ignores the 
religious dimension of Shakespeare’s play entirely in his 1913 treatment and makes no mention 
of either Shylock or Jessica). This in turn marks a new direction in Kofman’s writings of the 
1980s and 1990s, a reflection on Judaism and the Holocaust (the other main text which she 
published in 1987 was her first significant text on a Jewish theme, Smothered Words [Paroles 
suffoquées]).17 Now Kofman supplements Freud’s interpretation of Shakespeare’s text by 
pointing out that, as she puts it on the back cover: ‘This book shows (...) that the conversion of 
the Jew is merely a specific case of a general, reciprocal convertibility (of the characters 
Antonio, Bassanio, Shylock and the metals they represent, lead, gold, silver).’ Kofman’s book 
generalizes conversion, then, and extrapolates it from the religious variety, but I want to bring 
Kofman back to the religious theme, and focus in particular not on the forced conversion of 
Shylock but on the conversion of Shylock’s daughter Jessica in the play. 
In Conversions, Kofman focuses exclusively on Shylock’s conversion (CF, 67 / CE, 
161) and fails to thematize his daughter Jessica, who also converts. There are important 
differences between the fates of the two characters: in IV.1 Shylock is obliged by Antonio to 
agree to be forcibly converted as punishment for insisting on his bond — a ‘conversion 
stipulation’ (in the words of Joan Ozark Holmer) that is peculiar to Shakespeare’s version of 
the story and is not present in his source material.18 Jessica, on the other hand, willingly agrees 
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to convert (and abjure her Judaism) through marriage to the Christian Lorenzo. Jessica is 
converted through marriage, and as Holmer points out, Shakespeare presumably invents the 
name Jessica in the first place, with its allusion to the Biblical figure of Jesse, precisely in order 
to (silently) invoke a Biblical figure who is a willing convert to Christianity.19 Jessica elopes 
with Lorenzo, taking with her a large cache of her father’s jewels: she ‘steal[s] from the wealthy 
Jew’ (V.1.15) in all senses, and in this respect the play is a tale of multiple faithlessness. 
The only point in Kofman’s text where Jessica is mentioned is in the context of her theft 
of the jewels (CF, 61 / CE, 159). I want to argue that Kofman’s omission of Jessica otherwise 
is a blind spot that betrays an anxiety stemming from an uneasy identification with 
Shakespeare’s character. After all, the play has a very real personal connection for her if we 
bear in mind that Freud cites it according to its standard German title of Der Kaufmann von 
Venedig.20 Kofman’s significant personal investment in her analysis of Freud’s reading of the 
play becomes apparent if we read it in the context of the culmination of that autobiographical 
strain in her writing which is Rue Ordener, Rue Labat (1994). This is the text that reveals that 
for Kofman there is a very personal relation to ‘conversion’ in the religious sense because 
during the War she converted to Christianity herself. At the opening of Rue Ordener she invites 
us to read her earlier works in the light of it, so that is what I will briefly now do: ‘Maybe all 
my books have been the detours required to bring me to write about “that”’.21 
Her father Bereck Kofman acts as a kind of patron for Rue Ordener since he is invoked 
right at the outset in the form of his old fountain pen which, we are told, constrains her to write. 
We have seen that Kofman has no compunction about criticizing her mentor and ‘setting Freud 
straight’ in her analysis of his reading of Shakespeare, but the memory of her actual father 
(murdered in Auschwitz) is steadfastly and faithfully cultivated. Things are very different with 
her mother, though, and the main narrative in Rue Ordener, Rue Labat concerns how she turned 
against her birth mother in favour of her adoptive mother Mémé in wartime Paris. She relates 
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how she begins to eat pork and forgets her Yiddish; she is baptised and passes as Mémé’s 
daughter, willingly taking on the name Suzanne. She internalizes Mémé’s antisemitism and 
begins to hate her own Jewishness. In her repudiation of Judaism Sarah/Suzanne resembles 
Shakespeare’s Jessica, the willing convert. Yet her attitude to her two mothers is agonal, 
ambivalent, and defies Jessica’s binary logic. Paradoxically, Mémé makes her more conscious 
than ever of her Judaism — by, for example, introducing her to Jewish thinkers such as 
Spinoza, Bergson, Einstein and Marx — then after the War Sarah reclaims her Jewish 
inheritance, vindicating the fears of Shakespeare’s contemporary audience that the Jewish 
daughter’s conversion to Christianity might not last.22 I agree here with Joanne Faulkner, who 
argues ‘that Kofman’s abjection of Judaism is crucial to the construction of her Jewish identity 
in the context of the Nazi occupation — that at the heart of all identification is ambivalence.’23 
 
‘Turning to Men’ 
Such neglect of the character of Jessica is also one aspect of how very little Kofman remarks 
on the women in Shakespeare’s text, despite the fact that Conversions postdates her main 
groundbreaking work in feminist criticism — from ‘Baubô’ (1975) through The Enigma of 
Woman (1980) to Le respect des femmes (The Respect of Women) (1982).24 The final aspect of 
the ‘conversion’ theme I want to explore here is another that Kofman herself neglects, namely 
the various ways in which Shakespeare’s female characters are converted into men. The theme 
of the Saturnalia interested Kofman as early as Nietzsche and Metaphor,25 and not surprisingly 
it is also discussed in Conversions: The Merchant of Venice under the Sign of Saturn (CF, 65-
7 / CE, 160f.), but one important aspect of this feature of Elizabethan life as depicted in 
Shakespeare is the saturnalia of gender. Of course female characters were played by male actors 
in the first place, but this was compounded by further cross-dressing.26 
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In The Merchant of Venice, Jessica’s first conversion is actually in II.6, when she is 
‘transformèd to a boy’ (II.6.40) in order to escape from her father’s supervision and elope. 
When it comes to transforming and converting herself, then, Jessica is like Homer’s Odysseus, 
‘much-turned’ (πολύτροπον). Jessica’s travesty in II.6 then establishes the precedent for the 
rather better known cross-dressing episode in IV.1, when Nerissa and Portia ‘turn to men’ 
(III.4.78) to become the lawyers for the trial scene. But there is a chiastic structure here because 
just as Jessica prefigures Portia’s transformation, Portia returns the compliment with a dress 
rehearsal for Jessica’s conversion-by-marriage in III.1. Portia is indeed the first character to be 
converted in the play, for after Bassanio correctly chooses the lead casket, Portia tells him: 
‘Myself and what is mine, to you and yours / Is now converted’ (III.2.166-7). Portia seals this 
conversion by giving Bassanio the ring which he will subsequently give to ‘Balthazar’ in IV.2, 
only for the latter to return the ring in V.1 having converted back to Portia. In the world of 
Elizabethan comedy the conversion of cross-dressing is bound to be temporary and undone 
before the close, but as Holmer points out, these transformations can never be entirely undone 
since ‘Jessica, Portia, and Nerissa all have names that are feminine conversions of masculine 
names so that all three women “turn to men” (III.4.78) in names as well as cross-gendered 
disguise’.27 Such conversions are revealed to be but impermanent, reversible oscillations, 
which suggests the model of ambivalence rather than conversion once again. 
 
Conclusion: ‘This Conversion that is Called Translation’ 
Kofman’s critical reading of Freud’s interpretation of Shakespeare sublates multiple instances 
of conversion, converting them into so many kinds of ambivalence, and I have supplemented 
Kofman’s account by extending the reach of her model of ambivalence to cover a number of 
other kinds of conversion in The Merchant of Venice which Kofman and Freud both neglect. 
In conclusion, though, I want to ask what might be the implications of the general theory of 
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ambivalence that Kofman sets out for what Derrida refers to as ‘this conversion that is called 
translation’.28 
Kofman’s biographer Karoline Feyertag argues that ‘Without doubt the concept of 
translation is central to her thinking.’29 Christie McDonald figures Kofman’s wartime 
conversion as a ‘self-translation’,30 and Kofman figures herself as a translator (of Kafka) in the 
dream which she reports and analyses in the short 1976 text ‘Tomb for a Proper Name’.31 She 
took a keen interest in translations of her work and was very supportive of her translators, while 
in the works themselves, although she always gives original-language quotations where 
necessary for the purposes of her argument, she also cites an array of translations. In 
Conversions the first point that Kofman makes is about a translation: in her first footnote she 
criticizes translator Marie Bonaparte’s French title for Freud’s text (‘Le Thème des trois 
coffrets’ rather than ‘Le Motif du choix des coffrets’ — CF, 11n. 1 / CE, 162n. 1).32 But that 
initial comment is the only explicit reference to translation in Kofman’s text, which refuses to 
describe as a translation any of the conversions, inversions, replacements, exchanges, 
metaphorical substitutions, transformations or transmutations which it otherwise identifies in 
Shakespeare’s play. A decade after Kofman, Derrida will have no such qualms, claiming in his 
1998 lecture ‘What is a “Relevant” Translation?’ that ‘everything in the play can be retranslated 
into the code of translation and as a problem of translation’ (QTR, 30 / WRT, 372). He proceeds 
to read the play as a locus classicus of translation motifs, going so far as to claim (without 
reference to Kofman’s study) that ‘all translation is a conversion’ (QTR, 31 / WRT, 373),33 and 
his English translator Lawrence Venuti then ensures that the lecture (and its reading of The 
Merchant of Venice) becomes a classic of translation studies by including his own translation 
in his best-selling Translation Studies Reader. 
Unlike Derrida, Kofman did not write extensively on translation, and even Conversions, 
with its concern for all kinds of transformation, only points towards what a Kofmanian theory 
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of translation would look like, but she is at least more explicit elsewhere. One of the most 
substantial comments that Kofman makes on translation comes in Comment s’en sortir 
([‘Beyond Aporia?’]) (1983), when she is writing of the ambiguities of the word ‘poros’ in 
relation to translating it: 
 
To translate, to open up a path through a language by using its resources, to decide upon 
one meaning, is to escape the agonizing, aporetic impasses of any translation, to make 
the philosophical gesture par excellence: the gesture of betrayal (un geste de trahison). 
To recognize the untranslatability of poros and aporia is to indicate that there is 
something about the terms, which Plato borrows from a whole tradition, which breaks 
with a philosophical conception of translation, and with the logic of identity that it 
implies.34 
 
Following Walter Benjamin, Kofman is critical of the standard model of translation as 
conversion between equivalents, just as she is critical of Freudian dream theory for the same 
reason: ‘traditional’ translation for Kofman is a betrayal.35 The translator is faced with an array 
of choices and usually needs to plump for one or the other. In the case of highly polysemous 
terms like poros and aporia it is obvious that limiting the range of signification promotes loss 
and amounts to a betrayal, but in fact this is the case to a greater or lesser extent in all acts of 
translation. The alternative is to embrace at least a degree of untranslatability in every 
translation, to hold open ambiguity and prize ambivalence (the logic of the both/and). Most 
publishers would not look kindly on a translator who submitted final copy offering a wealth of 
unresolved alternatives, but it ought at least to be possible to treat the untranslatable as a kind 
of regulative idea. This is the position — of studied ambivalence — adopted by Barbara Cassin 
for her monumental project the Dictionary of Untranslatables, which defines its subject, and 
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its approach, with the watchword: ‘the untranslatable is rather what one keeps on (not) 
translating’.36 In adopting a theory of translation based not on equivalence but on ambivalence 
in this way, Cassin seems to me to be Kofman’s worthy successor. 
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